In a highly anticipated decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court in L.L. et al. v. Newell Brands, Inc. et al. (SC2105), held that Connecticut state law does not recognize a parent's claim for loss of filial consortium when a minor child suffers severe injuries due to a third party's alleged wrongdoing. The decision arose from a certified question submitted by the United Sates District Court for the District of Connecticut in a case where the plaintiff sought damages under the Connecticut Product Liability Act for injuries sustained by their child.
While Connecticut law permits claims for loss of spousal and parental consortium, the Court found that the underlying rationale for those claims, namely mutual dependence between spouses and a child's reliance on their parents, did not extend to a parent's loss of a child's companionship. Instead, the Court characterized the harm experienced by a parent in such circumstances as emotional distress rather than loss of consortium.
Background Facts
Mary Lapointe placed her infant daughter, L.L., in a Graco car seat on the kitchen counter next to an electric stove and left the room. During her absence, the car seat caught fire. L.L.'s aunt, Kayleigh Lapointe, discovered the fire and rescued the child, but L.L. suffered severe burns and injuries across her entire body.
Mary, Kayleigh, Justin (L.L.'s father), and L.L. through Justin as her next of friend, filed suit in federal district court against multiple defendants, including Newell Brands, Inc., the manufacturer of the car seat; Target Stores, Inc., the retailer; Haier U.S. Appliance Solutions, Inc., the distributor of the electric stove; and General Electric Company. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Connecticut Product Liability Act, but the district court dismissed those claims.
Additionally, Mary and Justin sought damages for loss of consortium, arguing that L.L.'s injuries deprived them of her society, care, and companionship. The defendants moved to dismiss, asserting that Connecticut law does not recognize loss of filial consortium claims. The district court denied the motion without prejudice and certified the legal question to the Connecticut Supreme Court under General Statutes §51-199b(d), seeking clarification on whether parents in Connecticut can recover for the loss of a severely injured child's consortium.
Connecticut Law and Filial Loss of Consortium
In deciding whether Connecticut law recognizes a parent's claim for loss of filial consortium, the Connecticut Supreme Court examined its prior rulings on consortium claims. The court first considered Hopson v. St. Mary's Hospital, 176 Conn. 485, 408 A.2d 260 (1979), which established a spouse's right to recover for the loss of consortium when their partner is injured due to a third party's negligence, The ruling encompassed both tangible losses, such as household services and financial support, and intangible losses, including affection, society, and companionship.
The court also reviewed Campos v. Coleman, 319 Conn. 36, 123 A.3d 854 (2015) which expanded the scope of consortium claims to include a minor child's right to recover for the loss of parental consortium when a parent in injured. This decision was based on the unique dependency relationship between a child and their parent.
The plaintiffs acknowledged that neither the Connecticut Supreme Court nor the appellate court had previously recognized a claim for loss of filial consortium. However, they argued that the Court's decision in Campos v. Coleman, which allowed a minor child to recover for the loss of parental consortium, logically extended to parental claims for loss of a child's consortium. They contended that once the Court recognized a child's right to such damages, extending it to a parent's corresponding claim was the next logical step.
Court Emphasizes Dependency as Key Factor in Consortium Claims
A central theme in the Court's reasoning was the concept of dependency, which has historically guided the discussion in loss of consortium claims. In Campos v. Coleman, the court ruled that minor children rely on their parents for essential needs, and it allowed recovery for loss of parental consortium based on the extent to which a parent provides such care. The Court even left open the possibility that a disabled adult child might have a valid claim if they remained dependent on a parent beyond the age of majority. Similarly, Hopson v. St. Mary's Hospital, the Court recognized spousal loss of consortium, emphasizing the mutual dependence and reliance that characterize marital relationships.
The plaintiffs argued that these same principles should extend to parent's claim for loss of a child's consortium, contending that parental or filial consortium are merely opposite sides of the of the same coin. However, the Court rejected this reasoning, emphasizing a fundamental distinction: while children are intrinsically dependent on their parents, the reverse is not true. Unlike a spouse or a child dependent on a parent, a parent does not rely on their child for financial, household, or emotional support.
The court pointed to the Texas Supreme Court's reasoning in Roberts v. Williamson, 111 S.W.3d 113 (2003), which underscored that the parent-child relationship, though significant, is not reciprocal in the same way as spousal or parental consortium. While a child required a parent's guidance, nurturing and supervision for social and emotional development, a parent's relationship with their child is not defined by dependence. Given this crucial distinction, the Court concluded that prior precedent did not support recognizing a cause of action for loss of filial consortium.
Court Rejects Recognition of Filial Consortium Claims, Emphasizing Legal Distinctions
While the court acknowledged the immense emotional suffering that parents endure when her child sustains a severe or disabling injury, it maintained that such distress is distinct from the type of relational loss addressed by the tort of loss of consortium. The court reaffirmed that loss of consortium is meant to remedy deprivation of a specific, legally recognized relationship, not general emotional pain.
The plaintiffs argued that the majority of the state's support such claims, citing that sixteen of twenty-six states that have addressed the issue allow some form of recovery. However, the court noted that only seven states have recognized the claim strictly through common law. In contrast, eleven states have done so through legislative action or as an extension of wrongful death statutes. Additionally, thirteen states and the District of Columbia have expressly declined to adopt a common law claim, while eighteen others continue to follow traditional rules, limiting recovery to economic damages such as lost earnings and medical expenses rather than intangible losses such as emotional distress related to the parent-child relationship.
The Court ultimately found guidance by following jurisdictions that recognize a clear legal and conceptual distinction between parental and filial consortium. Many states that allow recovery for a child's lost services do so under separate legal theories rather than as a recognized loss of filial consortium claim.
The dissenting opinion suggested that the legal landscape is shifting toward broader recognition of filial consortium claims, citing a draft provision for the Restatement (Third) of Torts recommending that these claims be allowed. However, the court rejected this reasoning as well, pointing out that the "trend" largely occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. and has since stalled. In the past 25 years, only one state court has embraced the cause of action, while several others have declined to do so.
Conclusion
Despite the severe nature of L.L.'s injuries, the Court declined to extend loss of consortium to filial claims. It emphasized that while Campos remains the controlling precedent in consortium claims in Connecticut, the relational interest in the present case was materially different. The Court concluded that these distinctions defeated the plaintiff's request to impose liability for third-party emotional injuries under a loss of consortium theory.