The New York Court of Appeals departed from long-standing precedent in its recent ruling in Flanders, allowing plaintiffs to pursue negligence claims for injury following a dog bite (Flanders v. Goodfellow, 2025 NY Slip Op 02261).
The court's decision to allow negligence claims in addition to strict liability significantly broadens potential exposure for insureds and raises the stakes in animal-related injury cases. Per this new two-pronged approach, a plaintiff can now assert both a strict liability claim if the owner knew or should have known about an animal's vicious propensities and/or an ordinary negligence claim if the owner failed to exercise due care under the circumstances that caused the injury.
Procedural History
Flanders sued the Goodfellows under theories of strict liability and negligence. The lower court dismissed both causes of action. With respect to strict liability, the Court found that Flanders failed to raise a triable issue as to whether the Goodfellows had actual or constructive knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities. The Court discounted the postal workers' affidavits, noting that they failed to show the Goodfellows were home or otherwise aware of the dog's behavior during those incidents.
The negligence cause of action was likewise dismissed pursuant to the established rule in Bard, in which the Court of Appeals previously held that no negligence claim could lie for injuries caused by domestic animals absent proof of known vicious propensities (Bard v. Jahnke, 6 N.Y.3d 592, 597, 2006). Flanders appealed.
Factual Background
Plaintiff Rebecca Flanders, a U.S. Postal Service mail carrier, was injured while delivering a package to the home of Defendants, Stephen and Michelle Goodfellow. On the day of the incident, Flanders observed that the mailbox was missing so she pulled her vehicle into the driveway to leave the package on the porch. She heard a dog barking, but saw no warning signs, either physically on the property or flagged in the postal service system, indicating the presence of a dangerous dog.
After confirming that the barking animal was not outside, Flanders exited her vehicle. Stephen Goodfellow opened the front door and as she began to hand him the package, Flanders heard the sound of a dog approaching. Despite Stephen's effort to restrain it, the dog bit Flanders' shoulder, causing a tear in the muscle, ultimately requiring multiple surgeries and leaving her with a permanent scar.
Relevant Evidence Regarding the Dog's Behavior
Discovery provided evidence that the Goodfellows' dog was about 70 pounds at the time of the incident and was previously acquired by the couple several years earlier as a puppy.
The Goodfellows' dog trainer testified that the dog did not exhibit aggressive tendencies toward people, only engaged in a scuffle with another alpha dog once. Similarly, the Goodfellows testified that the dog had not acted aggressively toward people and had never previously bitten or snapped at anyone. They also testified that the dog generally did not interact with strangers, as they typically did not allow strangers to enter their home.
Flanders submitted sworn affidavits from two postal workers who had previously delivered to the Goodfellows' residence. One asserted that the Goodfellows dog was "the most aggressive" on his route, recounting instances where the dog would "actually bite the window," "slam into the window glass," and "bare its teeth" while barking, snarling, and growling. Another asserted that their dog was "extremely loud, barking and snarling, and slamming its face and head into the the glass." Both workers posited that based on the loudness of the dog, if the Goodfellows were home during any mail deliveries that knew or should have known the dog was aggressive or dangerous before the attack.
Strict Liability
New York courts have long recognized that "the owner of a domestic animal who either knows or should have known of that animal's vicious propensities will be held liable for the harm the animal causes as a result of those propensities." Collier v. Zambito, 1 N.Y.3d. 444. 447 (2004), citing Restatement [Second] of Torts §509. A "vicious propensity" includes "the propensity to do any act that might endanger the safety of the persons and property of others in a given situation." Id. Once an owner's actual or constructive notice of a domestic animal's vicious propensities is established, strict liability follows for injuries caused by those propensities.
Two additional principles inform the application of this doctrine. First, "knowledge of vicious propensities may, of course, be established by proof of prior acts of a similar kind which the owner had notice," and a triable issue of fact may be raised even in the absence of a prior bite if the dog had previously growled, snapped, or bared its teeth." Bard at 597. Second, a vicious propensity may include "any behavior that reflects a proclivity to act in a way that puts others at risk of harm." Hastings v. Sauve, 21 N.Y.3d 122, 125 (2013).
Contrary to the conclusions reached by the lower courts, this Court determined that the record in this case presented a triable issue of fact as to whether the Goodfellows had constructive knowledge of their dog's allegedly vicious propensity. It based this conclusion on the affidavits Flanders submitted from two longtime postal workers as well as evidence that the dog pulled the owner to the ground during a walk and attacked another dog during training.
Although the Goodfellows denied knowledge of any aggressive behavior and pointed out that the postal workers had not reported the conduct to them or the post office, the court reasoned that those assertions go to credibility and could not resolve a factual question of notice.
Given the postal workers' accounts, the physical intensity of the dog's behavior, and the reasonable inference that the Goodfellows would have heard or observed such conduct while at home, the record created a triable issue of fact as to whether the Goodfellows should have known of the dog's propensity to act in a way that endangered others. The court concluded that the issue of constructive notice precluded summary judgment on the strict liability cause of action and warranted reinstatement.
Negligence
New York courts have barred plaintiffs from recovering under a common law theory of negligence for injuries caused by domestic animals. In Bard v. Jahnke, 6 N.Y.3d 592 (2006), the Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff could not recover under Restatement (Second) of Torts §518, which imposes liability for harm caused by a domestic owner if the owner was negligent in failing to prevent harm. The court reasoned that this theory was indistinguishable from a claim that an owner was negligent for failing to recognize the animal's vicious propensities. In Bard, the plaintiff was injured by a bull, but the court affirmed the dismissal of the negligence claim, concluding that liability for domestic animals must be governed solely by the strict liability standard articulated in Collier v. Zambito, 1 N.Y.3d 444 (2004), which found that liability exists only where the owner knew or should have known of the animal's violent propensities.
Following Bard, New York courts consistently rejected negligence claims in domestic animal cases, citing the principle of stare decisis. For instance, in Bernstein v. Penny Whistle Toys, 10 N.Y.3d 787 (2008), the court reaffirmed that a dog bite victim could not recover in the absence of proof that the dog's owner had knowledge of a violent propensity. These decisions cemented New York's reputation as an outlier jurisdiction in which negligence liability was unavailable for harm caused by domestic animals except in extreme cases.
However, over time, Bard's bright-line rule eroded as it became increasingly difficult to reconcile them with traditional tort principles. As established in the seminal case, Psalgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928), tort law seeks to hold individuals accountable for foreseeable harm caused by a failure to exercise reasonable care. This core principle, applied across a wide spectrum of activities, incentivizes people to act responsibly to protect others from injury. The court here found that an exemption for domestic animal owners created by Bard had the opposite effect. It instead shifted the burden of injury to victims and removed incentives for owners to observe and act on early signs of risk.
Exceptions to Bard began to emerge. In Hastings v. Sauve, 21 N.Y.3d 122 (2013), the court recognized an exception for wandering farm animals, holding that ordinary negligence principles could apply when an owner fails to prevent a domesticated animal from straying off property and causing harm. Known as the "wandering animal rule," this exception marked a departure from Bard's rigid limitation. Other decisions also began to chip away at the rule, further eroding its clarity and uniformity.
In reconsidering Bard's continued viability, the Court acknowledged that justice and fairness require a more flexible framework. It considered why a person injured by a domestic animal should be denied the opportunity to recover merely because the owner lacked knowledge of a specific dangerous trait, especially in instances where the owner failed to take basic precautions to prevent foreseeable harm.
Accordingly, pursuant to §509 and §518 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Court held that a two-pronged approach should be utilized. A plaintiff may proceed under a strict liability theory by showing that the animal's owner knew or should have known that the animal had vicious propensities or may proceed under ordinary negligence principles by showing that the owner failed to exercise due care under the circumstances causing the injury. Alternatively, Plaintiffs may assert both theories of liability.
Here, the record presented ample evidence to support a triable issue of fact. Flanders presented testimony from multiple postal workers describing repeated aggressive behavior by the Goodfellows' dog as well as other evidence that went to show the Goodfellows should have been aware of its vicious propensities. Despite this, the Goodfellows failed to secure the dog when Flanders approached their house to deliver the package. Whether this conduct meets the standard of reasonable care or meets the threshold of strict liability is a question for the jury.
Implications for Insurers and Insureds
This shift increases the likelihood of litigation and may result in higher defense costs and potential indemnity payouts. Insurers should anticipate more negligence-based claims involving domestic animals and be prepared for courts to allow such cases to reach a jury based on generalized allegations of foreseeability and failure to exercise due care. For insureds, particularly homeowners and property owners, the ruling underscores the importance of proactively managing animal behavior and property safety.
This change in the law highlights the importance of ongoing risk management practices, policyholder education, and close coordination between insurance carriers and their legal counsel when evaluating claims involving animal-related injuries in New York. If you have questions about how this decision may impact your operations, please reach out to a member of our team for further assistance.